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Abstract: 
Prior research on equity analysts focuses almost exclusively on those employed by sell-
side investment banks and brokerage houses. Yet investment firms undertake their own 
buy-side research and their analysts face different stock selection and recommendation 
incentives than their sell-side peers. We examine the selection and performance of stocks 
recommended by analysts at a large investment firm relative to those of sell-side analysts 
from mid-1997 to 2004. We find that the buy-side firm’s analysts issue less optimistic 
recommendations for stocks with larger market capitalizations and lower return volatility 
than their sell-side peers, consistent with their facing fewer conflicts of interest and 
having a preference for liquid stocks. Tests with no controls for these effects indicate that 
annualized buy-side Strong Buy/Buy recommendations underperform those for sell-side 
peers by 5.9% using market-adjusted returns and by 3.8% using four-factor model 
abnormal returns. However, these findings are driven by differences in the stocks 
recommended and their market capitalization. After controlling for these selection 
effects, we find no difference in the performance of the buy- and sell-side analysts’ 
Strong Buy/Buy recommendations.  
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  2 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last twenty years, there has been considerable research on the 
performance of sell-side analysts who work for brokerage firms, investment banks and 
independent research firms (Elgers, Lo, and Murray, 1995, Hilary and Menzly, 2006, 
Kesavan, Gaur, and Raman, 2010).
1 But because of data limitations, there has been very 
little research on buy-side analysts—that is analysts working for institutional investors 
such as mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds.  Yet buy-side analysts are worthy 
of study in their own right. In 2006, U.S. and U.K. investment firms spent $7.7 billion on 
buy-side research versus $7.1 billion on sell-side research (see Tabb Group, 2006). 
Further, as we discuss below, there are important differences between buy- and sell-side 
analysts that are likely to affect their behavior and performance.  
The limited research that is available on buy-side analysts employs a variety of 
research designs to examine their value and reports mixed findings. Cheng, Liu, and Qian 
(2006) find that portfolio managers rate research from the buy-side as almost three times 
more important to their decision-making than that of the sell-side. Frey and Herbst (2012) 
study buy-side analyst recommendations at a large global asset manager and find that 
changes in buy-side stock recommendations are followed by increases in the fund’s 
trading in those stocks. Groysberg, Healy and Chapman (2008) show that earnings 
forecasts issued by buy-side analysts at a large investment firm are more biased and less 
accurate than those for sell-side peers covering the same firms. Busse, Green and 
Jegadeesh (2012) find that sell-side analysts’ stock upgrades and downgrades have larger 
returns than buy and sell decisions of mutual fund portfolio managers for up to three 
months.
2 
Resolving whether buy-side research creates value is important for scholars 
interested in understanding how institutional factors and incentives affect research quality 
and value, but it is also highly relevant to managers at buy-side firms who face the 
                                                 
1 See Schipper (1991) and Bradshaw (2011) for reviews of the findings of this research. 
2 Busse, Green and Jegadeesh (2012) examine a similar question to ours. However, they study the 
performance of portfolio managers rather than buy-side analysts. They also limit the return holding period 
to three months or shorter, whereas we examine performance over the full investment cycle, from when a 
stock is recommended as a buy to when it is downgraded. Finally, they compare portfolio manager buy/sell 
decisions to sell-side analysts’ decisions to upgrade or downgrade a stock, whereas we compare buy 
recommendations for sell-side and buy-side analysts.     3 
challenge of allocating limited research resources. In discussing this issue, the director of 
equity research at a mid-sized money management firm observed: 
[Given] our falling budget … one option is to allow the budget cuts to fall 
primarily on sell-side research. In this course of action, we limit our access 
to sell-side experts and company management. We receive fewer company 
forecasts and less industry specific information. Given that we only have 6 
analysts each covering about 80 stocks, we really need the sell-side to give 
us granular information about companies. By cutting sell-side research, we 
receive less qualitative/forward looking information. … However, so far 
this is the option I have gone with. 
We revisit the question of the value of buy-side research by examining returns to 
recommendations issued by buy-side analysts at a large investment firm during the period 
1997 to 2004. Their performance is benchmarked by recommendation returns for analysts 
at 85 sell-side firms with recommendations available throughout the sample period. Our 
research is well suited to test the value of buy-side research. Fifty percent of the bonus 
awards for buy-side analysts at our sample firm are based on the performance of their 
Strong Buy and Buy recommendations, the metric we analyze. In contrast, the buy-side 
analysts receive no direct reward for issuing accurate earnings forecasts, potentially 
explaining the earlier finding of their forecast inaccuracy. Recommendation performance 
also appears to have had little direct relation to sell-side analysts’ bonus awards or job 
mobility (see Groysberg, Healy and Maber, 2011, and Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 
1999).  
The importance of buy-side analyst recommendation performance for portfolio 
managers is underscored by several advantages of buy-side recommendations over those 
from the sell-side. The private information in buy-side recommendations is likely to 
facilitate profitable trading by the firm’s portfolio managers, whereas sell-side 
recommendations are publicly disclosed to many institutions, generating an immediate 
stock price reaction (see Stickel, 1995 and Womack, 1996) and reducing some of the 
investment value of the recommendation. In addition, buy-side analysts are not subject to 
sell-side conflicts of interest from investment banking and brokerage businesses, and 
from concerns about preserving access to corporate managers. Evidence from prior 4 
studies suggests that these conflicts of interest reduce the performance of sell-side 
analysts’ stock recommendations.
3  
Despite these advantages, buy-side recommendations also have potential 
limitations. Interviews with managers at buy- and sell-side firms indicate that buy-side 
analysts typically cover more stocks than sell-side analysts, presumably reducing the 
depth and value of their analysis on any given stock. During the sample period, the buy-
side firm employs 46 analysts who on average each recommend 17 stocks. In contrast, 
the average sell-side firm employs 86 analysts who each issue recommendations for 12 
stocks. In addition, prior research suggests that investment firms tend to invest in stocks 
with low return volatility (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and high liquidity (see Falkenstein, 
1996, Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik 2004). By limiting their attention to these types of 
stocks, buy-side analysts may lower their recommendation returns.  
Our findings indicate that the buy-side firm’s analysts issue recommendations for 
companies with larger market capitalizations and lower stock return volatility than typical 
sell-side firms. Consistent with sell-side analysts having incentives to issue more positive 
recommendations to support their investment banking or brokerage business, or to 
preserve access to information from corporate managers, 44% of the buy-side analysts’ 
recommendations are Strong Buy or Buy ratings, versus 56% for sell-side analysts listed 
on IBES. Fourteen percent of the buy-side analyst recommendations are rated 
Underperform or Sell, compared to 7% for sell-side analysts.  
Returns generated by the buy- and sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations 
depend critically on controls for differences in the types of firms covered. Market-
adjusted and four-factor model abnormal returns from investing in Strong Buy/Buy 
recommendations are consistently lower for the buy-side firm than for sell-side firms. 
The annual market-adjusted returns from investing in the buy-side firm’s buy 
recommendations are 2.3% versus 8.2% for the average sell-side firm. This difference is 
partially explained by risk factors such as firm size, growth, momentum, and market risk. 
                                                 
3  Michaely and Womack (1999) and Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007) find that analysts with 
investment banking conflicts have less profitable recommendations than those with no such conflicts. 
Ertimur, Sunder and Sunder (2007) show that the translation of more accurate earnings forecasts into 
profitable recommendation returns holds only for non-conflicted analysts. In contrast, McNichols, O’Brien 
and Pamukcu (2006) find no evidence of lower returns for recommendations for sell-side analysts with 
conflicts of interest.  5 
The average sell-side firm’s recommendations are tilted towards smaller firms, whereas 
stocks recommended by the buy-side firm are size neutral. However, even after 
controlling for these factors, abnormal returns are 2.3% for the buy-side firm and 6.1% 
for the average sell-side firm. This under-performance holds for seven of the eight sample 
years.  
However, the under-performance of the buy-side firm’s analysts appears to be 
largely attributable to differences in the stocks they select. After controlling for 
differences in the market capitalization of companies covered by analysts at the buy-side 
firm and their peers, the out-performance of sell-side Strong Buy/Buy recommendations 
disappears.  The impact of stock selection on recommendation performance is reinforced 
by market-adjusted and abnormal returns for Strong Buy/Buy recommendations issued 
exclusively by sell-side analysts. The returns for these stocks are sizeable, particularly 
those for small cap stocks, which are likely to demand additional capital and therefore 
attract sell-side coverage. In contrast, Strong Buy/Buy recommendation returns for 
companies covered by both buy- and sell-side analysts are modest and comparable.  
Additional tests examine several other potential explanations for the findings. 
First, by comparing the performance of 27 analysts that the buy-side firm hires from the 
sell-side, we can control for differences in analyst skill. We find no evidence that buy-
side analysts have different skills than their sell-side peers.  Second, to address concerns 
that our study uses data for only one buy-side firm, limiting the generality of our 
findings, we use a survey to collect additional recommendations from a broader sample 
of sell-side and buy-side analysts. The results confirm those reported for the sample firm. 
Controlling for company selection, there is no significant difference in Strong Buy/Buy 
recommendation returns for buy- and sell-side analysts responding to the survey.  
  6 
SAMPLE, DATA, AND TESTS 
Sample and Data 
Our buy-side recommendations are for analysts at a large money management 
firm for whom fundamental research is an important part of the stock selection process. 
During the sample period, July 1997 to December 2004, bonus awards for analysts at the 
firm are based on two factors: market-adjusted returns generated from their Strong Buy 
and Buy recommendations (with a 50% weighting) and ratings from the firm’s portfolio 
managers (comprising the remaining 50% weighting). In addition, the firm’s top-rated 
analysts have long-term career opportunities within the research department and typically 
do not move into portfolio management.
4  
 The buy-side firm is consistently ranked as one of the ten leading firms in 
Reuters and Institutional Investor annual ratings of US fund management groups. 
Morningstar ratings of the firm’s equity fund performance (without regard to fund style) 
rank it above average versus the funds of other top ten firms for one-, three-, and five-
year horizons. The mean annual market-adjusted return for the firm’s large-cap equity 
funds (which are the most intensive users of its analyst reports) during the sample period 
exceeds 2.5%. Given these findings, the sample firm appears to be a strong performer.
 5 
From analyst reports provided by the sample buy-side firm, we collect stock 
recommendations issued and the recommendation dates for each stock covered. As 
reported in table 1, our sample comprises all 2,013 recommendations (for 567 different 
stocks) issued by the 46 analysts employed by the firm in the sample period (July 1997 to 
December 2004), an average of 34 analysts per year.   
We collect similar recommendation data for sell-side analysts from Thomson’s 
IBES. Since the buy-side firm survives throughout the sample period, our tests of buy-
side performance are subject to survivorship bias. In an attempt to control for any such 
bias, we require each sell-side firm to issue a minimum of five recommendations per 
                                                 
4 To assess whether our sample firm is comparable to other large money management firms, we also 
interview buy-side analysts and research directors at competitor firms. Their descriptions of their research 
businesses, as well as the ways they reviewed and rewarded buy-side analysts are very similar to that 
reported for our sample firm, increasing our confidence that it is not an outlier.   
5 Malkiel (1995) reports that equity mutual funds underperform the S&P 500 on average by 1.83% from 
1982 to 1991. Wermers (2000) finds that equity mutual funds outperform the S&P 500 by 1.5% from 1975 
to 1994. Both estimates are lower than the average market adjusted performance of the funds of the buy 
side firm in our sample.  7 
calendar year throughout the sample period, implying that the sell-side sample also 
comprises firms with survival bias. This restriction eliminates 92,876 recommendations 
and 542 firms from the final sample. As reported in table 1, the final sell-side sample 
includes 85 firms that issued 173,414 recommendations. The average sell-side firm 
employs a total of 86 senior analysts during the sample period (an average of 60 per year) 
who issue 2,064 recommendations for 671 stocks.     
 
Stock Selection Tests 
  Prior research suggests that there are likely to be important differences in the 
number and type of stocks selected for coverage by buy- and sell-side analysts that could 
affect recommendation performance. We examine several such factors:   
1. Firm Scale and Scope of Coverage. As discussed above, given differences in research 
scale, buy-side firms typically employ fewer analysts than sell-side firms and expect their 
analysts to cover many more stocks. Clement (1999) argues that analysts who cover a 
larger number of firms face greater task complexity and are able to devote less time to 
any particular stock, affecting the quality of their recommendations. Clement also argues 
that firms that employ more analysts are able to take advantage of economies of scale and 
provide their analysts with more resources. To examine these factors, we compute the 
average number of stocks recommended per analyst at each sample firm (NRECS) and 
the number of analysts employed by the firm (NANL) over the sample period.  
2. Return Volatility of Recommended Stocks. Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that fund flows 
and, therefore, the asset base upon which buy-side firms charge management fees, 
decrease as the volatility of fund returns increases. As a result, portfolio managers are 
likely to encourage their buy-side analysts to cover and recommend stocks with relatively 
low daily portfolio return volatility. Since portfolio managers’ are typically evaluated for 
out-performing size and risk benchmark portfolios, they are expected to be particularly 
averse to stocks with high abnormal volatility since risks for these stocks are less likely to 
be reflected in benchmark performance. To examine whether there are differences in the 
volatility of stocks recommended by the buy- and sell-side analysts we therefore compute 
the standard deviation of four-factor model daily abnormal returns for buy 
recommendations at each sample firm during the sample period (SVOL).  8 
3. Liquidity of Stocks Recommended. Falkenstein (1996) reports that money managers 
prefer to invest in liquid stocks, presumably to enable their relatively large positions to be 
unloaded with minimal impact on price. Consistent with this finding, Chen, Hong, 
Huang, and Kubik (2004) show that stock illiquidity plays an important role in explaining 
the performance of large mutual funds. Liquidity is also important for the performance of 
sell-side recommendations. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001), Jagadeesh 
and Kim (2006), and Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007) find that abnormal returns to 
sell-side buy recommendations are higher for stocks with low market capitalizations, 
which tend to be less liquid. To compare the liquidity of stock recommendations issued 
by buy- and sell-side analysts, we compute the average daily stock turnover and the 
average market capitalization of the recommended stocks for each sample firm.
6 Daily 
turnover (STURN) is the average number of shares traded per day as a percentage of 
shares outstanding throughout the sample period. Market capitalization (MCAP) is the 
average market capitalization of stocks recommended by a given sample firm over the 
sample period.  
4.  Conflicts of Interest. Prior research indicates that sell-side analysts face conflicts of 
interest arising from investment banking or brokerage businesses. Analysts working for 
investment banks are expected to cover stocks of banking clients and face pressure to 
issue positive recommendations for such firms (see Lin and McNichols, 1998, Michaely 
and Womack, 1999, Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 2000, and Lin, McNichols and O’Brien, 
2005).
7 In addition, sell-side analysts issue optimistic recommendations to encourage 
clients to purchase stocks and generate brokerage commissions (see Cowen, Groysberg 
and Healy, 2006). Analysts at the sample buy-side firm face no such pressures. The 
potential impact of these banking and brokerage incentives on analysts’ stock 
recommendation performance, however, is unclear. If they resulted in sell-side analysts 
issuing upwardly biased recommendations, the sell-side was likely to underperform the 
buy-side. Alternatively, banking relations could have enabled sell-side analysts to have 
                                                 
6 Given the preference of buy-side firms for liquid stocks, sell-side analysts are also likely to prefer to 
cover liquid stocks. However, they may also choose to cover less liquid stocks that are past or potential 
future banking clients, or that are considered attractive investments for retail clients and hedge funds. 
7 The Global Settlement of March 2003 attempted to eliminate this conflict by prohibiting investment 
bankers from playing a direct role in awarding bonuses to sell-side analysts, from having analysts assist 
them in investment banking activities, and by requiring that meetings between investment bankers and sell-
side analysts be supervised.    9 
access to superior information on clients, enabling their recommendations to show 
relatively strong performance. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2006) find that 
buy recommendation return performance is higher for firms where analysts issue a lower 
percentage of buy recommendations. To examine the effect of overall optimism due to 
conflicts of interest on stock recommendations, we compute the frequencies of Strong 
Buy/Buy, Hold, and Underperform/Sell stock recommendations for the buy- and sell-side 
samples. We aggregate Strong Buy and Buy recommendations into a single category since 
the buy-side firm does not distinguish between these recommendations for computing its 
analysts’ bonus awards. We also aggregate Underperform and Sell recommendations 
given the small number of such recommendations. 
 
Return Tests  
Our tests of the stock performance of the buy-side firm’s recommendations focus 
primarily on its analysts’ Strong Buy and Buy recommendations.
8 Given their use in buy-
side analyst compensation, these recommendations are expected to be most important for 
both the firm and its analysts and therefore provide a powerful test of the value of their 
research.
9 To construct our returns, a stock rated as a Strong Buy or Buy is bought and 
held from the trading day after its initial Strong Buy/Buy recommendation until the 
trading day after it is downgraded to a Hold, Underperform or Sell (if it continues to be 
covered) or, if coverage is discontinued, for 250 trading days (the typical horizon of 
analysts’ recommendations). We delay purchasing or selling a stock until the trading day 
after a recommendation changed to ensure that investors have access to the new 
recommendation and can modify their portfolios. The results therefore exclude any 
announcement day returns for recommendation changes, which likely leads us to 
understate the returns to sell-side recommendations given prior evidence that changes in 
their recommendations had an immediate effect on stock prices (see Stickel, 1995 and 
Womack, 1996). However, we believe that this delay in executing a trade is necessary to 
                                                 
8 In interviews, buy-side analysts who had worked on the sell-side inform us that their recommendations 
are comparable to those issued by sell-side analysts.   
9 One explanation for the firm’s focus on buy recommendations is that it is a long-only firm and is 
precluded from short positions. Of course, even long-only firms eventually liquidate their positions, so that 
sell recommendations have some value. In follow-up tests we also examine the value of hold and sell 
recommendations.  10 
allow portfolio managers to have sufficient time to adopt the buy-side 
recommendations.
10   
Returns are estimated for portfolios of Strong Buy/Buy stocks for each buy-side 
and sell-side firm. Our analysis uses returns for firms rather than analysts because we are 
concerned about potential dependencies in recommendation behavior and returns for 
analysts at the same firm. This could arise if macro research at a given firm takes a 
particular position on market prospects that affects recommendations and returns for all 
analysts at the firm. Firm portfolio returns control for such dependencies.
11  
We compute the daily return for each sample buy- and sell-side firm (Rjt) as 
follows: 
     
∑        
  
   
∑     
  
   

where Rit is the daily return on a stock, xijt takes the value one if the stock is 
recommended as a Strong Buy or Buy on day t-1 by an analyst at firm j, and nt is the 
number of recommended stocks on day t. We update the portfolio for each firm daily to 
add newly upgraded stocks and delete stocks that are downgraded or dropped. This 
generates a time series of daily buy recommendation returns for each buy/sell-side firm.  
To control for market and risk effects that drive stock returns, we compute daily 
market-adjusted returns, the metric used by the buy-side firm to evaluate analyst 
performance, and abnormal returns for each firm. Daily market-adjusted returns are the 
difference between the buy recommendation return for each firm less the return on the 
value-weighted S&P 500 market index. We annualize the sample period average daily 
market-adjusted return for each firm, assuming a 250-trading day year. 
The second return metric, abnormal returns, controls for risk and other factors 
known to be associated with stock performance using the four-factor model developed by 
Carhart (1997): 
                                                 
10 Including the announcement day returns increases the returns to sell-side Strong Buy/Buy 
recommendations, but it does not change the inferences in the paper.   
11 Our approach is similar to Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007), who compare the stock recommendation 
performance of investment banks and independent research firms. To assess whether our results are 
sensitive to using firm returns rather than analyst returns, we re-estimate our tests using the Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols and Trueman (2003) approach. The findings are similar to those reported in the paper.   11 
Rjt – Rft = j + j(Rmt – Rft) + sjSMBt + hjHMLt + wjWMLt + jt 
Rjt is the daily buy recommendation return for firm j; Rft is the daily risk-free return; Rmt is 
the daily return on the value-weighted market index; SMBt is the daily difference in 
return for a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks over a similar portfolio of large 
stocks; HMLt is the daily difference in return for a value-weighted portfolio of high book-
to-market stocks and a similar portfolio of low book-to-market stocks; and WMLt is the 
daily return on a value-weighted portfolio of stocks with high recent returns and a similar 
portfolio with low recent returns. The slope coefficients from this model represent risk 
factors for each firm-strategy portfolio, and the intercept is the average daily abnormal 
return. Average daily abnormal returns are annualized assuming 250-trading days per 
year.      
To compare the performance of buy- and sell-side firms, we estimate the 
following model:  
Rma,j or j =  + BUYSIDEj + j 
Rma,j  and j are the average annual market-adjusted and annualized average abnormal 
buy recommendation returns for firm j, and BUYSIDEj is an indicator variable that takes 
the value one for the buy-side firm and zero otherwise. The coefficient () on this 
variable indicates whether the market-adjusted or abnormal return for the buy-side firm is 
different from those for sell-side firms. The t-statistic on this estimate is used to infer 
whether there is a statistically significant difference in returns for the buy-side firms 
relative to its sell-side peers. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Stock Selection  
Table 2 compares variables we hypothesize to be related to stock selection for 
buy- and sell-side analysts. On average, analysts at the buy-side firm issue 
recommendations for 17 stocks during a calendar year versus 12 for the average sell-side 
analyst. The difference is statistically reliable, suggesting that the buy-side firm’s 
analysts cover more stocks than their sell-side peers, potentially reducing the quality of 12 
their recommendations. We find no significant difference in the total number of analysts 
at the sample buy-side firm during the sample period (46) versus the average sell-side 
firm (86), reflecting the large standard deviation for the number of analysts employed per 
firm.   
There is also evidence that buy-side analysts recommend less volatile and larger 
market capitalization stocks than their sell-side peers. The average daily standard 
deviation of abnormal returns for buy-rated stocks is 0.42% for the buy-side and 0.95% 
for the average sell-side firm. This difference is highly statistically reliable and implies 
that the stocks recommended by buy-side analysts have lower daily return volatility, 
consistent with portfolio managers encouraging buy-side analysts to cover and 
recommend low volatility stocks to facilitate managing funds flow and management fees 
(see Sirri and Tufano, 1998). In addition, stocks recommended by the buy-side firm 
analysts have an average market capitalization that is almost seven times larger than the 
average sell-side recommendation ($9.1 billion versus $1.3 billion). This difference is 
both economically and statistically significant. We find no significant difference in daily 
turnover for buy- and sell-side recommendations.  
Table 3 provides evidence on the impact of conflicts of interest on analysts’ stock 
recommendations. The buy-side firm analysts issue fewer Strong Buy/Buy 
recommendations and more Hold and Underperform/Sell recommendations than their 
sell-side counterparts during the sample period. Forty-four percent of the 
recommendations issued by the buy-side firm’s analysts are Strong Buy or Buy, compared 
to 56% for sell-side analysts. In contrast, 14% of buy-side analyst recommendations are 
Underperform/Sell, versus 7% for sell-side analysts. A Chi-Squared test indicates that 
these frequencies are significantly different. The findings are consistent with sell-side 
analysts issuing upward biased recommendations or truncating their recommendations as 
a result of conflicts of interest.
12  
 
 
                                                 
12 To explore whether the Global Research Settlement affected the relative optimism of sell-side analysts’ 
recommendations, we also estimate changes in sell- and buy-side analysts’ average ratings around the 
regulatory change. We find that both sell-side and the buy-side firms become less optimistic after the 
Global Settlement. We find no evidence of any incremental change for sell-side firms, but interpret these 
findings with caution given the turbulent market conditions at the time.   13 
Strong Buy/Buy Recommendation Performance  
Table 4 reports returns for all Strong Buy/Buy recommendations for the buy-side 
firm and its sell-side counterparts during the sample period. Analysts at the buy-side firm 
generate an annualized market-adjusted return of 2.3% that is statistically insignificant. In 
contrast, the average annualized market-adjusted return for sell-side firms is 8.2%, 
significantly different from zero and reliably higher than the buy-side firm return by 
5.9%. These findings are not attributable to a few high performing sell-side firms. The 
median sell-side annualized market-adjusted return during the sample period is 7.4%, 
more than three times the buy-side firm return. The buy-side firm’s market-adjusted 
Strong Buy/Buy recommendation return ranks at the 88
th percentile relative to sell-side 
peers.  
Four-factor abnormal returns are also reported in table 4 along with estimated 
factor loadings. The loading on the size factor for the buy-side firm is 0.12 compared to 
an average loading of 0.64 for the sell-side firms, implying that sell-side firms’ 
recommendations are tilted towards small firms whereas the buy-side firm 
recommendations are almost size neutral. Other loading differences are insignificant. 
After controlling for these factor differences, we find that the relative out-
performance of sell-side recommendations declines but continues to be economically and 
statistically significant. The annualized abnormal return for the buy-side firm is 2.3%, 
and statistically insignificant. In contrast, the average sell-side firm annualized abnormal 
return is 6.1%, significantly different from zero and significantly greater than that for the 
buy-side firm.
13  The median sell-side firm’s abnormal return is 5.3%, also significantly 
higher than the buy-side firm’s return. The buy-side firm’s Strong Buy/Buy 
recommendation abnormal return ranks at the 76
th percentile relative to sell-side firms.  
For completeness, table 4 also reports separate findings for Strong Buy and Buy 
recommendations. The estimates indicate that differences in recommendation returns for 
buy and sell-side analysts are large and typically statistically reliable for both categories. 
                                                 
13 Prior research also finds evidence of economically and statistically significant returns to sell-side 
analysts recommendations (see Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001), Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols and Trueman (2003), Jegadeesh, Kim, Krishche and Lee (2004), Li (2005), Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols and Trueman (2006), Jegadeesh and Kim (2006), Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2007)). 
However, the returns reported in our study should be interpreted with caution due to the survival bias for 
both the buy- and sell-side firms.  14 
For Strong Buys, annual market-adjusted returns are 3.6% for analysts at the buy-side 
firm and 8.9% for their sell-side peers. Abnormal returns that adjust for four-factor risks 
are 3.4% for the buy-side firm’s analysts and 6.4% for their sell-side peers.  For Buy 
recommendations, mean market-adjusted returns are 1.1% and insignificant for the buy-
side and 6.6% (statistically reliable) for sell-side analysts. Abnormal returns are 1.0% for 
the buy side (insignificant) and 4.9% (significant) for the sell-side.  
The sample period covers a wide range of market conditions, including the bull 
technology market of the late 1990s and the crash in technology stocks in 2000 and 2001. 
To examine the sensitivity of our findings to differing market conditions, we replicate our 
tests for each sample year. The findings, reported in table 5, show that annualized 
market-adjusted Strong Buy/Buy recommendation returns are lower for the buy-side firm 
than for the average sell-side firm in seven of the eight sample years (except in 1998). 
Given the small sample size (eight yearly observations), we used a nonparametric 
statistic, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, to assess whether this pattern is statistically 
reliable.
14 For market-adjusted returns the test has a p-value of 0.042. Annual results for 
the buy-side firm percentile rank relative to sell-side firms tell a similar story. From 1997 
to 2004 the buy-side firm underperforms the median sell-side firm in six out of eight 
years and the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test has a p-value of 0.064.    
Abnormal Strong Buy/Buy recommendation returns for the buy-side firm are also 
lower than the sell-side firm mean in seven of the eight years (all but 2002). The 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test p-value is 0.039. Percentile ranks of the buy-side firm’s 
annual abnormal returns show that the buy-side firm outperforms the median sell-side 
firm for only one year. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test of differences in percentile ranks 
yields a p-value of 0.055, marginally significant. 
In summary, during the sample period, Strong Buy/Buy recommendations for the 
average sell-side firm generate higher returns than those for the buy-side firm. This 
difference is both statistically and economically significant. Results of annual 
performance differences indicate that the sell-side returns beat those of the buy-side firm 
in six or seven of the eight sample years.   
                                                 
14 The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test uses information about both the magnitude and sign of differences to 
infer statistical significance.  15 
Hold and Sell Recommendation Performance 
We also report findings for Hold and Underperform/Sell ratings. The test design 
is similar to that discussed for combined Strong Buy/Buy recommendations. However, the 
sell-side firm sample size declines for Hold and Underperform/Sell recommendation 
tests, since only 64 of the 85 firms issue five or more Hold recommendations per year, 
and only 11 issue five or more Underperform/Sell recommendations.  
The results are reported in table 6. There is little difference in returns to Hold 
recommendations for the buy- and sell-side firms. Annualized market-adjusted returns 
are 5.7% for the buy-side firm and 5.8% for the average sell-side firm. Abnormal returns 
are 6.0% for the buy-side firm and 4.8% for the average sell-side firm. For the mean and 
median sell-side firm, the Hold recommendation returns are marginally lower than those 
reported for Strong Buy/Buy recommendations in table 4. Both market-adjusted and 
abnormal returns are insignificant though, highlighting the unreliable profitability of hold 
recommendations. However, the buy-side firm returns for Hold recommendations are 
actually higher than those reported as Strong Buy/Buy and are statistically reliable.
15  
For Underperform/Sell recommendations, the average market-adjusted and 
abnormal returns for buy-side analysts’ Underperform/Sell recommendations are -1.3% 
and -1.1% respectively, both statistically insignificant and no different from those for the 
average sell-side firm.
16  
 
Stock Selection and Buy Recommendation Performance  
To understand whether differences in factors predicted to affect stock selection 
are related to the superior buy recommendation returns for sell-side analysts, we estimate 
the following regression model: 
                                                 
15 The superior performance of Hold returns over those for Strong Buy/Buy recommendations for buy-side 
analysts is inconsistent with the pattern for sell-side analysts reported in this study and in prior research 
(see for example, Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, 2001, p. 534). 
16 These findings exclude two influential observations for financially distressed companies with stock 
prices less than $1 that showed large percentage (but modest monetary) gains in value during the 
recommendation period. If these observations are included, the annualized market-adjusted and abnormal 
returns from buy-side Underperform/Sell ratings are 13.0% and 9.5% respectively, significantly greater 
than the -2.5% and -1.1% for the average sell-side firm.  16 
j = 0 + 1BUYSIDEj + 2NRECSj + 3NANLj + 4SVOLj + 5STURNj + 6MCAPj + 
7RECj + j 
 is the average four-factor model abnormal return to Strong Buy/Buy recommendations 
issued by analysts at a given firm. BUYSIDE is an indicator variable that takes the value 
one for the buy-side firm and zero otherwise. REC is an indicator variable that takes the 
value 1 for strong buy recommendations, 2 for buys, 3 for holds, etc., and is constructed 
to control for differences in recommendation optimism. The remaining variables are 
defined above. The model is estimated using time-series averages of the dependent and 
independent variables for each firm to allow for dependencies in the variables within 
firms. Since is an estimate from a first-stage regression, we adjust the standard errors in 
the second stage model by taking account of measurement error and the loss of degrees of 
freedom using the approach proposed by Murphy and Topel (1985). 
The regression results are reported in table 7. The first model includes a single 
independent variable, the buy-side indicator variable. The estimated coefficient of 3.8% 
is statistically significant, as reported in table 4. The second model includes all the 
remaining variables except for average market capitalization of stocks recommended. 
None of the added variables is statistically significant. The estimate for the buy-side 
variable continues to be positive and statistically reliable, indicating that scope of 
coverage, stock volatility, and stock turnover do not explain the strong performance of 
sell-side analysts.  
However, in the third model, where we add the portfolio market capitalization 
variable, the estimated capitalization coefficient is -0.026 and significant, implying that 
firms’ buy recommendation returns decline when the recommended stocks have large 
market caps. In addition, the estimated indicator for the buy-side firm declines by 40%, 
from 3.8% in the first model to 2.3% and becomes statistically insignificant.  
To further evaluate the impact of stock selection on recommendation 
performance, we estimate market-adjusted and abnormal returns for Strong Buy/Buy 
recommendations for four subsets of companies: (i) those with recommendations issued 
by both buy- and sell-side analysts; (ii) those where the only recommendations are issued 
by sell-side analysts; (iii) those with large market capitalizations where the only 
recommendations are issued by sell-side analysts; and (iv) those with small market 17 
capitalizations where the only recommendations are issued by sell-side analysts.  Firms 
are classified as having small (large) market caps if their average capitalization is lower 
than or equal to (higher than) the median firm recommended by sell-side firms. 
The findings are reported in table 8. For companies with recommendations issued 
by both buy- and sell-side analysts, the mean market-adjusted returns for Strong Buy/Buy 
recommendations are 2.3% for buy-side analysts and 3.2% for their sell-side peers. Four-
factor abnormal returns for the same portfolios are 2.3% and 3.05% respectively. For 
both metrics, tests of differences in means are insignificant. In contrast, mean market-
adjusted (10.2%) and abnormal (8.1%) returns for Strong Buy/Buy recommendations 
issued for companies covered only by the sell-side are economically and statistically 
significant.  These findings suggest that much of the outperformance of sell-side analysts 
comes from their selecting stocks not recommended by buy-side peers.  
Classifying recommendations for companies covered only by sell-side analysts 
into those for small and large companies reinforces the above findings and indicates that 
the superior performance of sell-side analysts Strong Buy/Buy recommendations 
emanates largely from their exclusive coverage of small companies. The mean market-
adjusted return to sell-side analysts’ Strong Buy/Buy recommendations for small stocks 
not covered by the buy-side is 12.3% versus 5.5% for large stock recommendations. 
Mean abnormal returns for these two portfolios are 11.7% and 4.7% respectively. A 
difference in means test indicates that the small versus large company differences are 
statistically as well as economically significant for both metrics.  
In summary, much of the under-performance of buy-side analysts’ Strong 
Buy/Buy recommendations comes from differences in stock selection. Both buy- and sell-
side analysts cover large stocks that presumably offer the liquidity demanded by the 
firm’s portfolio managers. But sell-side analysts also recommend smaller stocks, perhaps 
because these companies are active in raising new capital and are therefore actual or 
potential investment banking clients. The high returns from these recommendations boost 
sell-side analysts’ recommendation returns and fully explain their superior performance.  
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Additional Tests 
 (1)  Returns Using Reuters’ Recommendations.  Recent evidence by Ljungqvist, Malloy 
and Marston (2008) raises questions about the integrity of sell-side recommendation data 
reported on IBES. Ljungqvist et. al. (2008) report evidence of changes in 
recommendations on the historical IBES database between 2002 and 2004. These include 
additions of new recommendations, deletions of prior recommendations, removal of the 
analyst identifier codes for some recommendations, and changes in some actual 
recommendations. As a result, they report that abnormal returns to 2002 sell-side buy 
recommendations increase from 5.9% using the 2002 database to 8.1% using the 
modified 2004 version. Some of the changes are corrections of data errors but others 
appear to be changes by analysts (who self-reported their recommendations) to conceal 
poor performing recommendations, a potential cause for concern in interpreting our 
findings.
17   
To examine whether this potential bias explains the strong performance of sell-
side analysts in our tests, we re-estimate sell-side Buy recommendation returns using data 
from Reuters. To the best of our knowledge, Reuters database is not updated by analysts 
and is therefore less likely to be subject to bias introduced by analyst “corrections.” The 
Reuters sample is 56 sell-side firms that satisfy the data requirements discussed in section 
2. These firms are somewhat larger than the IBES sample firm. On average each firm in 
the Reuters sample employs 94 analysts, and issues 3,837 recommendations per year for 
833 different stocks. In contrast, the average IBES sample firm employs 86 analysts and 
issues 2,064 recommendations per year for 671 different stocks. Nonetheless, results 
using the Reuters database are very similar in magnitude and statistical reliability to those 
reported above for the IBES sample. The average (median) market-adjusted return for 
sell-side firms is 8.1% (7.4%) and the average (median) abnormal return is 6.2% (6.1%). 
(2) Differences in Buy- and Sell-Side Analyst Skill. Another competing explanation for 
our findings is that sell-side firms draw their analysts from a more talented labor pool 
than did buy-side firms. Although this hypothesis does not explain why we find the 
outperformance of sell side analysts to have been driven by their recommendations for 
                                                 
17 Since the Ljungqvist et. al. study, IBES has investigated its recommendation data and updated its 
database to correct for any observed errors. We use the updated IBES data for our primary tests.    19 
small stocks. To make sure that our results are robust when we hold analyst skill 
constant, we compare the performance of buy-side analysts who switch to or from the 
sell-side during the sample period. Twenty-seven of the sample firm’s analysts work at 
sell-side firms at some point during the sample period. We compare the average 
performance of the stock recommendations for these analysts during their buy- and sell-
side employment. Since the analyst is held constant in the test, we effectively control for 
any differences in analyst ability. Results are reported in Table 9.  
The Strong Buy/Buy recommendations for these switching analysts generate mean 
market-adjusted returns of 4.7% during their sell-side employment, and -2.0% during 
their buy-side years. Comparable four-factor abnormal returns are 1.7% and -0.3% 
respectively. Neither of the differences in market-adjusted or abnormal returns across the 
two employment periods is statistically significant. When we impose the additional 
restriction that each portfolio includes only stocks that the analyst recommends both 
before and after the switch to the buy- or sell-side, we find that the market-adjusted and 
abnormal return differences are even smaller.  Specifically, the Strong Buy/Buy 
recommendations for these switching analysts generate market-adjusted returns of 1.9% 
during their sell-side employment, and -1.8% during their buy-side years. Four-factor 
abnormal returns are 0.7% and -0.3% during the sell-side and buy-side years respectively. 
(3) Generalizability. One limitation of our study is that our sample of buy-side analysts is 
from a single firm, raising questions about whether the findings can be generalized to 
other investment firms. Ideally, our tests would have used recommendation data from 
analysts at multiple investment firms. But we do not have access to such data. However, 
we are able to obtain recommendations for buy- and sell-side analysts from two surveys 
we conducted in 2005 and 2006. The surveys request more than 5,000 analysts to provide 
us anonymously with recommendations for three stocks that they cover from a list of S&P 
500 companies in the industries they indicated they covered. We receive responses from 
967 analysts, representing a 19% response rate. The sample includes 637 sell-side 
analysts who issued 2,334 recommendations (1,202 Strong Buy/Buy), and 329 buy-side 
analysts who provide 480 recommendations (282 Strong Buy/Buy) during the period 
12/1/2005 to 3/7/2007.  20 
There are several important differences between the survey recommendations and 
those analyzed in the earlier tests. First, we observe the date that we receive a given 
analyst’s survey recommendations, but not the date that those recommendations are 
originally issued. Second, we do not have information on whether or when the survey 
analysts subsequently revise their recommendations. As a result, we are obliged to modify 
the trading strategy to estimate recommendation performance. For the Strong Buy/Buy 
strategy we purchase stocks recommended as Strong Buys/Buys on the date we receive 
the survey response and hold them for the next 250 trading days, the investment horizon 
of analyst recommendations.  
Given our limit on the companies covered by the survey, recommendations made 
by both the buy- and sell-side samples are for large companies. The mean market cap of 
stocks recommended by buy-side analysts is $30.7 billion versus $27.6 billion for those 
recommended by the sell-side. The difference is insignificant, increasing our confidence 
that the recommended stocks for the two subsamples have similar size/liquidity and that 
the selection differences documented above are unlikely to be important for the survey 
findings. 
The average market-adjusted Strong Buy/Buy recommendation return for the 
survey buy-side analysts is 1.4% versus 2.3% for the sell-side analysts. Mean four factor 
abnormal returns are 3.2% for buy-side analysts and 3.0% for sell-side peers. None of 
these means is individually significant, and the differences between the buy- and sell-side 
samples are also insignificant.   
In summary, the survey findings are consistent with those reported for the buy-
side firm and the size-adjusted sell-side sample, and indicate that after controlling for 
stock selection, there is no significant difference in the performance of buy- and sell-side 
analysts Strong Buy/Buy recommendations. However, we interpret these findings with 
caution, as the surveys are subject to potential response bias and other limitations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We examine buy recommendation performance for analysts at a large, buy-side 
firm relative to analysts at sell-side firms covered by IBES throughout the sample period 
(mid-1997 to 2004). We find that buy-side firm analysts recommend stocks with stock 21 
return volatility roughly half that of average sell-side analysts’ recommended stocks 
(0.42% versus 0.95%), and market capitalizations almost seven times larger ($9.1 billion 
versus $1.3 billion). We interpret these findings as indicating that portfolio managers 
(buy-side analysts’ clients) prefer that buy-side analysts cover less volatile and more 
liquid stocks. Sell-side analysts cover these same firms, but also cover smaller less liquid 
firms, perhaps because they are actual or potential investment banking clients.  
In addition, we find that the buy-side firm analysts’ stock recommendations are 
less optimistic than their sell-side counterparts’, consistent with buy-side analysts facing 
fewer conflicts of interest. Forty-four percent of the recommendations issued by the buy-
side firm are Strong Buy or Buy ratings, versus 56% for analysts at sell-side firms. The 
higher frequency of sell-side Strong Buy/Buy recommendations is offset by a lower 
frequency of Underperform and Sell ratings (14% for the buy-side firm analysts versus 
7% for analysts at sell-side firms).  
Univariate tests of market-adjusted and abnormal returns from investing in Strong 
Buy/Buy recommendations indicate that analysts at the buy-side firm consistently under-
perform their peers at the average sell-side firm. Annualized market-adjusted returns 
from investing in the buy-side firm’s buy recommendations are 2.3%, compared to 8.2% 
for sell-side firms. Abnormal buy recommendation returns for the buy-side firm are also 
2.3%, versus a mean of 6.1% for sell-side firms. Relative to its sell-side peers, the buy-
side firm Buy recommendation returns rank in the lowest quartile. Finally, this pattern of 
underperformance for the buy-side firm holds for six or seven of the eight sample years.  
However, these results change once we control for the market capitalizations of 
the firms recommended. Multivariate tests show a significant negative relation between 
Strong Buy/Buy recommendation abnormal returns, even those that incorporate the size 
factor, and the market capitalization of stocks recommended. After controlling for this 
effect, we find no difference in the performance of Strong Buy/Buy recommendations for 
the buy-side firm and its sell-side peers. Additional tests also show no difference in the 
Strong Buy/Buy recommendation returns of stocks covered by both buy- and sell-side 
analysts. In contrast, there are sizable abnormal returns for recommended stocks covered 
only by sell-side analysts, particularly those with small market capitalizations.   22 
One plausible interpretation of these findings is that buy-side analysts deliberately 
cover large stocks because they are the types of liquid stocks their portfolio managers 
were willing to buy. Such a restriction limits the returns that can be earned from buy-side 
recommendations, as documented earlier by Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004). But 
it does not undermine buy-side analysts’ credibility with large fund portfolio managers 
since they face similar constraints themselves. Not surprisingly, sell-side analysts cover 
the same large cap liquid stocks. But they also cover high-performing small cap stocks, 
perhaps because these stocks are past clients or are potential future clients. 
The findings are robust to analysis using recommendations from Reuters rather 
than IBES, to controls for analyst skill (comparing analysts who switch to the buy-side 
from the sell-side), and to the use of recommendations for buy- and sell-side analysts 
from a 2005/6 survey.  
Our finding that buy-side research fails to out-perform that of sell-side analysts 
raises questions about whether investment firms should continue to rely on their own 
research rather than using research from sell-side analysts. One explanation for their joint 
survival, given our findings, is that the two types of research reinforce and complement 
each. But we also recognize that our analysis is incomplete because we do not have 
information on the relative cost of the two forms of research.  
Our study also raises several questions for scholars. Despite our best efforts to 
examine the generality of our findings, we are limited to recommendations for a single 
buy-side firm and to analysts from multiple buy- and sell-side firms that completed a 
survey. Future studies can extend the analysis by studying other buy-side firms. Do our 
findings hold more generally? Do they hold for smaller mutual funds whose managers 
and analysts are less constrained by liquidity? Do they hold for analysts at hedge funds 
that are able to short stocks? Answers to these questions might help sell-side and buy-side 
executives allocate their financial and human resources more strategically.  
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 Table 1 
Buy- and sell-side stock recommendation samples.
a  
The sample period is July 1997 to December 2004. 
 
 
 
  
Buy-side 
firm 
Sell-side 
firms 
 
     
Number of analyst firms  1  85 
Number of U.S. company recommendations issued by sample f
from July 1997 to December 2004  2,013  173,414 
     
Average per firm     
Total number of analysts issuing recommendations in the      
sample period  46  86 
Number of recommendations issued  2,013  2,040 
Number of stocks recommended  567  671 
     
Recommendations     
Number of recommendations for companies covered by         
both buy- and sell-side analysts 
2,013  105,782 
     
Number of recommendations for companies covered only      
by sell-side analysts 
0  67,632 
     
 
a  The buy-side sample comprises all stock recommendations issued by the sample buy-side firm during the 
sample period. The sample of sell-side firms comprises all recommendations issued by sell-side firms listed 
on IBES that issue at least five recommendations per year throughout the sample period. We eliminate 
92,876 recommendations issued by 542 firms that do not appear consistently in the IBES database. 
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Table 2 
Firm and buy-recommendation stock characteristics for analysts at the sample buy- and 
sell-side firms. The sample comprises one buy-side firm and 85 sell-side firms for the 
period July 1997 to December 2004.
 
 
 
 Mean  for   
Variable 
Sell-side 
firms 
Buy side 
firm 
    
Average number of stocks recommended per analyst in 
the sample period (NRECS)  12  17
** 
    
Average number of analysts employed per firm in the 
sample period (NANL)  86  46 
    
Average daily standard deviation of abnormal returns for 
stocks recommended by analysts in the sample period 
(SVOL) 0.95%  0.42%
** 
    
Average daily turnover as a percentage of shares 
outstanding for stocks recommended by analysts 
(STURN) 0.51%  0.50% 
    
Average market capitalization (in $ billions) of stocks 
recommended by analysts (MCAP)  1,350  9,147
** 
    
 
** Significantly different from the sell-side mean at the 1% level using a two-tailed test. Statistical 
significance is estimated using a t test that compares the sell-side firm mean to the value for the buy-side 
firm. 
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Table 3  
Recommendation frequency for buy- and sell-side analysts. The sample comprises one 
buy-side firm and 85 sell-side firms for the period July 1997 to December 2004. 
 
 
 
Buy-side firm  Sell-side firms 
 
Number  Percent  Number  Percent 
Panel A: Full Sample         
Strong Buy/Buy   888 44.1%  97,355  56.1% 
Hold   851 42.3%  64,379  37.1% 
Underperform/ Sell   274 13.6%  11,680  6.8% 
   Total   2,013  100.0%  173,414  100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Statistic
a  203.7
**
 
 
a  The Chi-Square Statistic indicates whether there is a significant difference between the recommendation 
frequencies for the buy-side firm and the two sell-side samples.  
 
** Significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4 
Market-adjusted and abnormal returns from investing in analysts’ buy recommendations 
for buy-and sell-side firms. The sample comprises one buy-side firm and 85 sell-side 
firms for the period July 1997 to December 2004.
a 
 
 
 
Buy-side  
firm 
  
Sell-side 
firms 
 
Difference 
 
Panel A: Combined Strong Buy/Buy Recommendations  
Market-adjusted returns        
 Mean  2.3%
ns  8.2%
**  (5.9%)
** 
 Median  2.3%
ns 7.4%
** (5.1%)
**
Buy-side firm percentile rank   88%     
Abnormal returns       
 Mean  2.3%
 ns  6.1%
**  (3.8%)
** 
 Median  2.3%
ns 5.3%
** (3.0%)
**
Buy-side firm percentile rank   76%     
Regression factor weights       
    Market factor  1.11
**  1.06
**  0.05
 ns 
    Size factor  0.12
**  0.64
**  (0.52)
** 
    Book to market factor   0.37
**  0.25
**  0.12
 ns 
    Momentum factor  -0.25
**  -0.19
**  (0.06)
 ns 
Panel B: Strong Buy Recommendations 
Market-adjusted returns        
 Mean  3.6%
*  8.9%
**  (5.3%)
*  
 Median  3.6%
*  8.1%
**  (4.5%)
* 
Abnormal returns       
 Mean  3.4%
*  6.4%
**  (3.0%)
* 
 Median  3.4%
*  6.1%
**  (2.7%)
* 
Number of firms  1  85   
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Panel C: Buy Recommendations 
Market-adjusted returns        
 Mean  1.1%
ns  6.8%
**  (5.7%)
* 
 Median  1.1%
ns  6.5%
**  (5.4%)
* 
Abnormal returns       
 Mean  1.0%
ns  4.9%
*  (3.9%)
ns 
 Median  1.0%
ns  4.6%
*  (3.5%)
ns 
Number of firms  1  85   
 
**, * Significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively using a two-tailed test. 
ns Not significant at the 5% 
level or lower using a two-tailed test. 
a We construct buy recommendation portfolios for each sample firm by buying and holding stocks rated by 
the firm’s analysts as a Strong Buy or Buy from the day after the initial recommendation is announced until 
the day after they were downgraded to a Hold or lower rating (if they continued to be covered), or for 250 
days (if they ceased to be covered). Market-adjusted returns are returns to a firm’s buy recommendation 
portfolio less the return on the value-weighted S&P 500 market index. Abnormal returns are computed for 
each firm’s buy recommendation portfolio by regressing daily portfolio returns on the market excess return, 
a zero-investment size portfolio return, a zero investment book-to-market portfolio return and a zero 
investment price momentum portfolio return. The abnormal return is the annualized regression intercept 
based on a 250 trading day year.   
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Table 5 
Annual market-adjusted and abnormal returns from investing in analysts’ buy 
recommendations for buy- and sell-side firms. The sample comprises one buy-side firm 
and 85 sell-side firms for the period July 1997 to December 2004.
a 
 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
                 
Market-adjusted returns                  
    Buy-side firm   (0.8%) (9.1%)(10.8%) 18.6% 5.5% (0.5%) 5.7%  3.8%
    Sell-side firm mean  3.7% (11.2%) 7.3% 22.4% 27.5% 6.6%  19.8%  8.5%
    Difference  4.5% (2.1%) 18.1% 3.8% 22.0% 6.1%  14.1%  4.7%
      p level
b  0.042 
    Buy-side firm % rank   62%  31%  71%  38%  81%  53%  91%  71% 
    p level
b  0.064               
                 
Abnormal returns                 
    Buy-side firm   (2.1%) 5.6% 3.6% 14.9% (1.8%) 10.7%  2.0%  3.5%
    Sell-side firm mean  (1.0%) 11.1% 12.9% 20%  10.7% 6.5%  6.5%  5.3%
     Difference  1.1% 5.5% 9.3% 5.1% 12.5% (4.2%) 4.5%  1.8%
    p level
b  0.039 
    Buy-side firm % rank   53%  56%  60%  59%  81%  35%  59%  64% 
    p level
b  0.055               
                 
 
a We construct buy recommendation portfolios for each sample firm by buying and holding stocks rated by 
the firm’s analysts as a Strong Buy or Buy from the day after the initial recommendation is announced until 
the day after they were downgraded to a Hold or lower rating (if they continued to be covered), or for 250 
days (if they ceased to be covered). Market-adjusted returns are returns to a firm’s buy recommendation 
portfolio less the return on the value-weighted S&P 500 market index. Abnormal returns are computed for 
each firm’s buy recommendation portfolio by regressing daily portfolio returns on the market excess return, 
a zero-investment size portfolio return, a zero investment book-to-market portfolio return and a zero 
investment price momentum portfolio return. The abnormal return is the annualized regression intercept 
based on a 250 trading day year. 
b The p level is for a two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Table 6 
Market-adjusted and abnormal returns from investing in analysts Hold and 
Underperform/Sell recommendations for buy- and sell-side analysts’ for the period July 
1997 to December 2004.
a 
 
 
Buy-side  
firm 
  
Sell-side 
firms 
 
Difference 
 
Panel A: Hold Recommendations 
Market-adjusted returns        
 Mean  5.7%
*  5.8%
ns (0.1%)
ns
 Median  5.7%
ns  5.3%
ns  0.4%
 ns 
Abnormal returns       
 Mean  6.0%
*  4.8%
ns 1.2%
 ns
 Median  6.0%
*  5.3%
ns  0.7%
 ns 
Number of firms  1  64   
Panel B: Underperform/Sell Recommendations 
Market-adjusted returns        
  Mean   (1.3%)
 ns  (1.1%)
 ns  (0.2%)
 ns 
  Median   (1.3%)
 ns  2.2%
 ns  (3.5%)
 ns 
Abnormal returns       
  Mean   (1.1%)
 ns  (2.5%)
 ns  (1.4%)
 ns 
  Median   (1.1%)
 ns  0.5%
 ns  (1.6%)
 ns 
Number of firms  1  11   
* Significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test.
 ns Not significant at the 5% level or lower using a two-
tailed test. 
a We construct buy recommendation portfolios for each sample firm by buying and holding stocks rated by 
the firm’s analysts as a Hold or Underperform/Sell from the day after the initial recommendation is 
announced until the day after they were changed to another rating (if they continued to be covered), or for 
250 days (if they ceased to be covered). Market-adjusted returns are returns to a firm’s buy 
recommendation portfolio less the return on the value-weighted S&P 500 market index. Abnormal returns 
are computed for each firm’s buy recommendation portfolio by regressing daily portfolio returns on the 
market excess return, a zero-investment size portfolio return, a zero investment book-to-market portfolio 
return and a zero investment price momentum portfolio return. The abnormal return is the annualized 
regression intercept based on a 250 trading day year.   34 
Table 7 
Relation between analysts’ Strong Buy/Buy recommendation abnormal returns and 
analyst, bank and recommended stock characteristics for one buy-side firm and 85 sell-
side firms during the period July 1997 to December 2004.
a 
 
 
 
Parameter 
 
Estimate  
(t statistic) 
 
Estimate  
(t statistic) 
 
Estimate  
(t statistic)
 
     
Intercept  0.0603 0.0193 0.2873 
  (8.06) 0.15  1.56 
Buy-side indicator variable (BUYSIDE) -0.0378
** -0.0588
* -0.0227
ns
  (-5.05) (-2.29) (-0.83) 
Average number of stocks recommended per 
analyst in the sample period (NRECS)    0.0022  
(0.66) 
0.0024 
(0.75) 
Average number of analysts employed per firm 
in the sample period (NANL)    -0.0107    
(-0.83) 
-0.0127    
(-0.96) 
Average daily standard deviation of abnormal 
returns for stocks recommended by analysts in 
the sample period (SVOL) 
  -0.0816    
(-0.02) 
-1.4444     
(-0.38) 
Average daily turnover as a percentage of 
shares outstanding for stocks recommended by 
analysts (STURN) 
  0.8926 
(0.16) 
3.9158    
(0.76) 
Log of average market capitalization for stocks 
recommended by analysts (MCAP)     -0.0258    
(-2.42) 
Mean recommendation for a firm is during 
sample period (REC)    0.0239  
(0.50) 
0.0642   
(1.28) 
  
Number of observations  86  86  86 
     
Adjusted R-squared  0.4%  4.7%  12.2% 
     
**, *  Significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively using a two-tailed test. 
ns Not significant at the 5% 
level or lower using a two-tailed test. 
 
a The dependent variable is the mean abnormal return to buy recommendations at a given firm throughout 
the sample period. To estimate the mean recommendation for a firm (REC), Strong Buy recommendations 
are assigned the value 1, Buys 2, Holds 3, etc.). The model is estimated using time-series averages of the 
dependent and independent variables for each firm to allow for dependencies in the variables within firms.   
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Table 8 
Market-adjusted and abnormal returns for subsamples of sell-side analysts’ Strong 
Buy/Buy recommendations during the period July 1997 to December 2004.
a 
 
 
 
 
Subsample 
Market-adjusted 
Return 
Abnormal        
Return 
Mean Median Mean Median 
      
  
Sell-side returns for: 
 
Firms covered by both the buy- and sell-side  3.20%
 ns 2.80%
 ns 3.05%
 ns 3.10%
 ns
 
Firms covered only by the sell-side   10.20%
** 9.90%
** 8.10%
** 7.60%
**
Difference (7.00%)
* (7.10%)
* (5.05%)
* (4.50%)
*
 
Large firms covered only by the sell-side   5.00%
* 4.80%
* 4.70%
* 4.60%
*
 
Small firms covered only by the sell-side   12.30%
** 10.90%
** 11.40%
** 9.10%
**
Difference (7.30%)
** (6.10%)
* (6.70%)
* (4.50)%
*
 
Buy-side returns for: 
 
Firms covered by both the buy- and sell-side  2.30%
 ns  2.30%
 ns  
  
  
 
**, * Significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively using a two-tailed test. 
ns Not significant at the 5% 
level or lower using a two-tailed test. 
 
a We construct buy recommendation portfolios for each sample firm by buying and holding stocks rated by 
the firm’s analysts as a Strong Buy or Buy from the day after the initial recommendation is announced until 
the day after they were downgraded to a Hold or lower rating (if they continued to be covered), or for 250 
days (if they ceased to be covered). Market-adjusted returns are returns to a firm’s buy recommendation 
portfolio less the return on the value-weighted S&P 500 market index. Abnormal returns are computed for 
each firm’s buy recommendation portfolio by regressing daily portfolio returns on the market excess return, 
a zero-investment size portfolio return, a zero investment book-to-market portfolio return and a zero 
investment price momentum portfolio return. The abnormal return is the annualized regression intercept 
based on a 250 trading day year. 
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Table 9 
Results of robustness tests for analysts switching form sell-side firms to the buy side 
firm, and for recommendations from survey of buy- and sell-side analysts.  
 
Panel A: Performance of Strong Buy/Buy recommendations for 27 buy-side analysts who 
switched from the sell-side  
  Buy-side 
analysts 
employed by 
buy-side firm  
Same buy-side 
analysts 
employed by 
sell-side firm  
Difference 
Mean returns for all Strong Buy/Buy recommendations 
  Market-adjusted  (2.0)%
ns 4.7%
ns (6.7)%
ns 
  Abnormal  (0.3)%
ns 1.7%
ns (2.0)%
ns 
     
Average number of stocks in 
portfolio  
67 52   
     
Mean returns for Strong Buy/Buy recommendations for same stocks 
  Market-adjusted  (1.8)%
ns 1.9%
ns (3.7)%
ns 
  Abnormal  (0.3)%
ns 0.9%
ns (1.2)%
ns 
     
Average number of stocks in 
portfolio  
48 48   
 
 
Panel B: Performance of buy and sell-side analyst Strong Buy/Buy recommendations 
collected from analyst survey 
  Buy-side 
analysts 
Sell-side 
analysts 
Difference 
Mean  returns     
  Market-adjusted  1.4%
ns 2.3%
ns (0.9)% 
ns 
  Abnormal  3.2%
* 3.0%
* 0.2%
 ns 
     
Number of recommendations  282  1,202   
Number of analysts       
Average market capitalization  $30.7 billion  $27.6 billion   
     
 
*  Significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test. 
ns Not significant at the 5% level or lower using a two-
tailed test. 
 